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I.   INTRODUCTION 
What is the appropriate role for government in economic activity and in providing 
social safety nets for a country’s population? How does government involvement in 
economic life, through direct activity or through fiscal policies, affect growth and 
development as well as the distribution of income? Academics have wrestled with these 
major questions for decades. Different views on the role of government have fostered 
sweeping political experiments, some of which have ended in dramatic failure. Sweden’s 
economic policy framework arguably represents the archetype of the Scandinavian economic 
model, which combines a core of private sector production and market-based incentives with 
extensive redistribution and government interventions, particularly in labor markets. Through 
its tax and transfer system, as well as labor bargaining framework, the Swedish model 
attempts to ensure a fairly equal distribution of income and pervasive social safety nets. A 
notable feature of the model is the high average and marginal tax rates on labor income and 
savings. Economic theory suggests high taxes would distort labor supply and saving 
decisions, leading to welfare losses and, potentially, to lower growth. 
 
Indeed, in the mid-1990s, critics of the welfare state argued vociferously that welfare 
state policies had undermined Sweden’s growth performance. The book Turning Sweden 
Around by Lindbeck et al. (1994) reported a decline in Sweden’s ranking of income per 
capita relative to other countries. A special issue of Economic Journal in 1996 centered on 
whether Sweden had suffered a relative decline in economic growth and living standards and, 
if so, the reasons for such a decline. A part of the debate focused on the empirical question of 
the accurate measurement of Sweden’s economic performance relative to that of other 
advanced economies and various technical issues germane to this question. A second part 
revolved around whether the decline could be attributed to the large public sector or to other 
factors such as demography and specific policy mistakes. In broad terms, this debate has 
obvious parallels with the debate on the causes of slower growth in Europe, the so-called 
“eurosclerosis” question. 
 
Do the high tax burden and labor market interventions that are associated with the 
Swedish model generate slow economic growth, or “eurosclerosis”? This paper returns to the 
question with the advantage of several additional years of data and offers a new interpretation 
of the growth performance. In doing so, we provide a cautionary note about inference on 
determinants of growth, with implications for cross-country growth studies. In particular, we 
argue that Sweden’s ranking in income per capita slipped suddenly at the time of the banking 
crisis of the early 1990s, rather than being an outcome of redistributive policies.   
 
We employ a combination of analytical arguments and formal econometric testing to 
show that sharp negative shocks, such as Sweden’s banking crisis in the early 1990s, 
produced a permanent decline in the level of output at the time of the shock. This is evident 
from examining the times-series behavior of output rather than narrowly focusing on a single 
measure of average long-run growth. This finding underscores the fragility and 
misspecification of long-run cross-country growth studies and underscores the advantage of 
analyses that include the time dimension. In the Swedish case, the sizable output loss   - 4 - 
 
associated with its financial crisis dwarfs any decline associated with tax distortions and 
public interventions, which remain largely unnoticeable in the macroeconomic data.    
 
Our story and arguments unfold as follows. We briefly summarize some of the central 
features of the Swedish economic model and outline the academic evidence on the 
relationship between growth and redistribution. We then turn to the debate over the fall in 
income rankings, providing our own evidence and trying to unscramble the contrary claims 
by proponents and critics of the welfare state model. Although the graphical evidence is 
compelling by itself, we formalize our test of the permanent income loss by using a common 
factor regime-switching model to distinguish permanent and temporary output loss. 
 
II.   THE SWEDISH ECONOMIC MODEL
2 
  In many respects, Sweden can be regarded as the epitome of a modern “social 
democratic” welfare state economy. The Swedish model is characterized by large, centralized 
institutions and extensive income transfers and social safety nets intended to secure a 
relatively equal distribution of income and wealth. This mandate for reducing inequality, 
alleviating poverty and insuring against social risks receives broad political support, perhaps, 
in part, because of the relatively higher emphasis on universalism in benefits. Social 
insurance arrangements provide generous support for a wide range of risks, and the tax- 
transfer system has been fairly successful in achieving the intended goals of reducing poverty 
and income inequality. These social arrangements have contributed to quality-of-life 
indicators—including indicators of public health and education—that are among the highest 
in the world. The Swedish model is also optimistic on the useful contribution of centralized 
public sector activities in economic production and management. Sweden has a relatively 
high share of public enterprises and extensive regulatory and supervisory intervention, as 
well as a large public sector responsible for provision of social services. 
 
The large size of the welfare state is evident from a comparison of Sweden with other 
countries in terms of the magnitude of the tax-transfer system in relation to the economy. For 
instance, general government income transfers were about 18½ percent of GDP in 2000, 
compared with the OECD average of about 13 percent. According to OECD Revenue 
Statistics for 1998, Sweden’s personal income tax was 18.6 percent of GDP vs. the OECD 
average of 10.1 percent. Other notably high elements in the tax structure include employer’s 
social security contributions of 10 percent of GDP compared with the OECD average of 
5.8 percent of GDP, and payroll taxes at 3.9 percent of GDP compared with the OECD 
average of 0.4 percent of GDP. Indeed, the high levels of direct taxation and social security 
contributions made Sweden’s tax wedge on labor the second highest in the OECD in 1998, 
                                                 
2 This section draws from Thakur, Keen, Horváth, and Cerra (2003). Chapter 2 provides 
more information on the main elements of the Swedish welfare state. Additional details on 
labor market interventions and components of the tax system are outlined in later chapters of 
the book.   - 5 - 
 
after Germany, and at 52 percent of GDP, Sweden had the highest ratio of total tax revenues 
to GDP of any OECD country.
3  
 
Sweden’s tax system is structured to minimize distortions caused by the mobility of 
tax bases. In order to attract and retain corporate tax bases, Sweden has maintained relatively 
low statutory rates on corporate income taxes. In 2002, for example, Sweden’s corporate 
income tax rate, at 28 percent, was below that of most other OECD member countries. 
Estimates of the marginal effective corporate tax rate—which includes the impact of interest 
deductions and depreciation allowances—are very low, providing only a small 
discouragement to investment.
4 Thus, the bulk of the tax burden required to support the large 
welfare state falls on labor income. Nevertheless, with the exception of a few well-publicized 
cases of emigration, Swedish labor mobility has not yet been significant, and labor 
participation rates are among the highest in the world. 
 
The Swedish model is also characterized by interventions in labor markets that extend 
well beyond the tax-transfer system. Centralized labor bargaining forms a pivotal element, 
aiming for full employment at high participation rates in order to ensure an egalitarian 
income distribution and a large tax base capable of financing high public expenditures. 
Sweden also supplements passive unemployment insurance with active labor market 
programs intended to promote a rapid return to employment and to prevent long-term 
unemployment that results from demotivation and loss of skills by the jobless.  
 
III.   EVIDENCE ON GROWTH AND REDISTRIBUTION 
We define “sclerosis” as ongoing sluggish growth caused by distortions stemming 
from the policies and government interventions that collectively constitute a welfare state 
economy.  There are a variety of theoretical arguments that link a high tax-transfer system to 
efficiency losses and low growth. Nevertheless, there are counterarguments and mixed 
empirical evidence for the relationship between growth and redistribution. This section 
summarizes the main thrust of the literature. 
 
The high average and marginal tax rates required to support an extensive income 
transfer system are typically assumed to have a negative impact on efficiency by distorting 
the leisure-work choice toward more leisure. Calculations by Agell, Englund, and Södersten 
(1995) show that high marginal taxes can generate substantial welfare losses even if labor 
supply elasticities are small. Table 1 quantifies the marginal efficiency cost of the Swedish 
tax system arising at different assumed compensated labor supply elasticities. The 
approximations of the marginal tax wedge (the difference between marginal productivity and 
                                                 
3 However, there are some issues of comparability, as Sweden’s revenue figures include the 
taxation of gross social transfers, and relatively high tax expenditures. The magnitude of 
social spending, and the high level of taxation required to support it, have also been 
influenced by the relatively early rise in the average age of the population in Sweden. 
4 See Chapter 6 of Thakur, Keen, Horváth, and Cerra (2003) for further details.   - 6 - 
 
real take-home pay) have been calculated by Du Rietz (1994). The wedges were considerably 
lower in 1991 than in 1988. The table illustrates that even at low labor supply elasticities, a 
sufficiently high marginal tax rate produces a large marginal welfare loss for each additional 
krona of tax revenue. There is a region of the tax wedge at which the efficiency cost starts to 
increase very rapidly and quickly outstrip the extra tax revenue. 
 
Table 1. Marginal Excess Burden per Krona of Tax Revenue (in percent)
0.05 0.11 0.25
Marginal tax wedge (percent):
   62 (average blue-collar worker, 1991) 8.2 19.0 54.7
   63 (average earned income, 1991) 8.6 20.1 59.0
   70.5 (average blue-collar worker, 1988) 12.7 31.6 121.8
   71.5 (average white-collar worker, 1991) 13.4 33.9 139.1
   73 (average earned income, 1988) 14.6 37.8 175.0
   79 (average white-collar worker, 1988) 22.0 65.3 2280.0
   85.5 (average senior white-collar worker, 1988)  41.0 192.5 ---
Tax rate that maximizes tax revenue  94.5 89.5 79.5





However, studies of the impact of tax rates on labor supply in Sweden suggest that while cuts 
in income tax rates would increase the labor supply of both primary and secondary earners, 
the growth effects of a small change in marginal taxes may not be substantial, in part because 
the most elastic group, secondary earners, accounts for a smaller share of the total workforce. 
 
Tax policy can also deter growth. Progressive taxation may discourage human capital 
accumulation by taxing returns to increased future wages at a higher rate. High corporate 
taxes may discourage capital accumulation. Finally, high capital income tax on individuals 
may distort saving decisions.  
 
Social transfers and other fiscal expenditures can also have an impact on labor supply 
and growth. Liberal unemployment compensation may discourage job search. Generous 
sickness and early retirement programs may lower labor supply by reducing the opportunity 
cost of leisure. However, other kinds of government expenditures may encourage growth. 
For example, public expenditures on education, health, and infrastructure may enhance 
growth (Barro, 1989; Doppelhofer, Miller and Sala-i-Martin, 2000; Easterly and Rebelo, 
1993) by adding to the human and physical capital stock. Indeed, Sweden has maintained 
high levels of public expenditure on health, education, and infrastructure, and it has 
performed well on measures of attainment. Sweden scored the highest in literacy skills in the 
OECD’s International Adult Literacy Survey published in 2000 and tops the list of 94 
countries in the State of the World index covering women’s and children’s health, education 
and political stability (Thakur, Keen, Horváth and Cerra, 2003). Moreover, Berndt and 
Hansson (1992) find that infrastructure investment had a significant impact on Swedish 
productivity.  
 
In a model of endogenous growth, Barro (1990) combines the offsetting effects of 
fiscal taxes and expenditures. In his model, income taxes diminish capital accumulation and 
growth, but a publicly provided capital good (such as infrastructure) financed from such   - 7 - 
 
taxation increases economic productivity. The model predicts a hump-shaped relationship 
between the size of government and growth. At low levels of taxation, the government can 
increase growth by raising tax and spending rates. The higher provision of public goods 
enhances the returns to private investment (crowding in). However, as taxation rises to very 
high levels, growth declines as the distortions to output outweigh the productivity benefits of 
public infrastructure. Overall, the optimal tax rate is positive. 
 
Although redistribution can have negative effects on growth through the distortionary 
taxes required to finance it, there are a number of theoretical channels by which 
redistribution can improve growth. If capital market distortions generate liquidity constraints 
on investment that prevent resources from going to the most productive uses, redistribution 
can increase growth by allowing the poor to accumulate capital. The provision of a social 
safety net to protect against some lifetime risks for which private insurance may not be 
available can also encourage productive risk-taking by reducing the costs of failure. The 
social and political stability that arises from a more equal income distribution can enhance 
incentives to save and invest, thereby increasing growth. Equality can contribute to better 
health and promote schooling, thereby permitting poor individuals to take advantage of their 
talents.  
 
A number of empirical studies have found a positive relationship between public 
transfers or income equality and growth (Sala-i-Martin, 1992; Barro, 1989; Alesina and 
Rodrik, 1994; Persson and Tabellini, 1991; Van Der Ploeg, 2004). Benabou (1996) compared 
the Philippines and South Korea, which had similar macroeconomic indicators in the early 
1960s. In the subsequent thirty years, the more equal South Korea grew fivefold, while the 
output level of the Philippines barely doubled. Alesina and Perotti (1996) found evidence that 
inequality creates social unrest and political instability, which, in turn, depress investment 
and growth. However, the direction of causality between redistribution and growth is difficult 
to ascertain. Faster growing countries may be able to afford more generous social assistance 
schemes. The relationship may also depend on the level of development, with inequality in 
poor countries contributing to poor health and lack of schooling. 
 
The empirical evidence is mixed for OECD countries. Some studies (Hansson and 
Henrekson, 1994; Weede, 1986; Weede, 1991; Persson and Tabellini, 1994; and Nördström, 
1992) find that various social transfers have a significant negative effect on growth in 
samples of OECD countries, whereas other studies find a positive effect (Korpi, 1985; 
Castles and Dowrick, 1990; and McCallum and Blais, 1987). The last study finds a 
nonmonotonic relationship. 
 
IV.   THE DEBATE ON SWEDEN’S RANKING OF INCOME PER CAPITA 
Given the conflicting evidence and theoretical arguments for the relationship between 
tax-transfer systems and growth, we now turn to the specific case of Sweden’s growth record. 
As discussed above, Sweden has maintained one of the highest levels of taxation and 
transfers of all countries. Therefore, Swedish tax and spending rates are arguably above the 
level that would maximize its growth rate. Such concern motivates the debate over sclerosis. 
This section discusses the various issues of interpretation and alternative explanations of the 
data on Sweden’s per capita income and its ranking among other advanced countries.   - 8 - 
 
 
A.   Developments and Controversies in Rankings 
Sweden progressed from being one of the poorest countries in Europe in the middle 
of the nineteenth century to being among the richest countries in the world by 1950. 
Industrialization based on raw materials, an exceptionally high rate of labor productivity 
growth, and Swedish neutrality in the world wars brought about a century of uninterrupted, 
strong economic growth. 
 
 
Although Sweden’s per capita income declined relative to the average of the 12 
European countries over the subsequent twenty years, it still retained its high ranking through 
1970. Lindbeck et al. (1994) note that Sweden’s ranking among OECD countries fell from 
number 3 in 1970 to number 14 in 1991.
5 Since this claim has generated considerable debate, 
the table on which it was based is reproduced below for reference (Table 3). 
 
The debate over the apparently sharp decline in Sweden’s ranking occupied a special 
issue of Economic Journal in 1996. Korpi (1996) fervently argues that measurement 
problems, sample period selection, and other factors give an appearance of relative decline, 
whereas in fact Sweden’s income has been fairly stable in relative terms. Even if the ranking 
had declined, factors such as demography, catching up, and avoidable macroeconomic 
mistakes may have caused the relative decline, rather than Sweden’s welfare state policies.  
 
Several technical issues have a significant impact on output or growth comparisons 
and play a role in the disagreements over the case of Sweden. The use of current exchange 
rates or selection of an arbitrary year for measurement could produce misleading and volatile 
GDP comparisons. Periods of deteriorating terms of trade and of rampant inflation can 
contribute to an erosion of the exchange rate and a diminishing relative income position. 
Developments of the U.S. dollar-ECU or dollar-euro cross rates also affected the position of 
the Swedish krona at times, such as in the mid-1980s. For instance, Korpi (1996) used 1985 
exchange rates to present Sweden’s relative income over time. In 1985, the U.S. dollar was 
strong relative to the EMS currencies, and the Swedish krona was tied to a basket with a 
disproportionate weight on the U.S. dollar. The use of a strong krona presented the level of 
Sweden’s income favorably. Purchasing power parity (PPP) adjusted exchange rates are 
widely used in cross-country growth comparisons to help avoid this problem.  
 
                                                 
5 The ranking depends on the exchange rate and other issues, and could vary among sources. 
1870 1913 1950
79.8 83.9 134.4
Table 2. Sweden's Relative GDP per capita 1/
   Source: Maddison (2001).
   1/ At 1990 PPP dollars relative to the 12 largest European economies.  - 9 - 
 
Index Index
1 Switzerland 145 1 United States 125
2 United States 141 2 Switzerland 122
3 Luxembourg 108 3 Luxembourg 120
3 Sweden 108 4 Germany 110
5 Germany 105 5 Canada 108
6 Canada 102 5 Japan 108
7 Netherlands 101 7 France 103
8 Denmark 100 8 Denmark 99
8 France 100 9 Belgium 98
10 Australia 99 10 Austria 97
11 New Zealand 98 10 Iceland 97
12 United Kingdom 93 12 Italy 95
13 Belgium 90 12 Norway 95
14 Austria 86 14 Sweden 94
15 Italy 85 15 Netherlands 93
16 Finland 82 16 Australia 91
17 Japan 80 17 Finland 90
18 Norway 33 18 United Kingdom 88
19 Iceland 75 19 New Zealand 78
20 Spain 64 20 Spain 72
21 Ireland 50 21 Ireland 65
22 Portugal 42 22 Portugal 52
23 Greece 41 23 Greece 44
24 Turkey 17 24 Turkey 20
Table 3. Sweden: Relative Ranking Between 1970 and 1991
1970 Rank 1991 Rank
   Sources: OECD National Accounts; Lindbeck et al. (1994).  
 
 
The choice of sample periods can have a decisive influence on the change in relative 
rankings. The output levels of a large group of fairly rich OECD countries are so close to 
each other that different states of the business cycle can produce volatile rankings among the 
countries. The comparison of ranking in Lindbeck et al. (1994) relies on the end points of 
1970 and 1991. According to Korpi, Sweden’s high ranking in 1970 is based on a peak in 
economic activity, as growth was 5.6 percent in this year. Sweden does not drop to fourteenth 
place until 1991, which was the beginning of a major recession. Korpi’s presentation of 1973 
and 1989 shows Sweden’s position in a more favorable light because, in 1973, Sweden 
suffered a relatively deep recession, while in 1989 it was in the midst of an unsustainable 
boom. Thus, the choice of the sample’s end points can change the conclusion about Sweden’s 
relative decline substantially. 
 
Sweden’s initial high income position would suggest that a part of the decline in its 
relative ranking reflects a convergence phenomenon. Countries with lower initial per capita 
incomes will tend to have higher growth rates as they “catch up” with the richer countries, 
through, among other factors, the importation of technology. Although this factor need not 
imply a change in countries’ per capita output rankings, it should force the levels to   - 10 - 
 
converge. Convergence would make it easier for small differences in other factors to 
significantly affect country rankings. Convergence implies that even if countries’ rankings 
remain the same, there should be a decline over time in the relative income levels of the 
initially rich countries. Dowrick and Nguyen (1989) estimated that Sweden’s smaller scope 
for catching up reduced growth by 0.8 percentage points during the period 1950–73 
compared with the OECD average. Decomposing growth, they found that the rate of 
differential total factor productivity (TFP) growth was 0.79 percent per year in 1950–60, and 
-0.25 percent per year in 1973–85. 
 
The timing of the 
demographic transition 
can be an important 
consideration in the 
analysis of per capita 
income. One of the 
reasons underlying 
Sweden’s relative decline 
in the OECD’s ranking by 
per capita GDP may be 
that the demographic 
shock of an aging 
population hit Sweden 
well before other 
countries. This was the 
consequence of the earlier 
rapid expansion, which 
was boosted by the 
relatively young population after World War II, which, unlike in other European countries, 
was not decimated by the war. Figure 1 shows that the ratio of working-age persons to the 
total population in Sweden declined slightly over the four decades, while it rose, on average, 
in 24 OECD countries. 
 
B.   Long-term Analysis 
Over a long span of years, Sweden seems to have slipped in the table of rankings of 
living standards as measured by per capita income. This section analyzes the developments in 
Sweden’s relative income position, taking into account several of the arguments discussed 
above. To avoid problems of sample period selection, we examine the entire path of relative 
per capita output. The effects of convergence can be viewed by comparing the paths of other 
initially rich countries with that of Sweden. Figure 2 shows the path of per capita GDP in 
Sweden and 23 other OECD countries over the period 1960-2002 based on 1995 prices and 
purchasing power parity (PPP) exchange rates. From the mid-1970s through 1990, most 
countries experienced a slight slowdown in growth, but growth in several countries took off 
again in the 1990s. Between 1960 and the mid-1970s, Sweden was in the top half of the 
countries in the sample, but its per capita income was fairly close to that of many countries. 
Indeed, the figure shows the striking proximity of a number of countries’ income levels and 
illustrates the ease of switching ranking over time, even due to business cycle influences. 















1960 1962 1964 1966 1968 1970 1972 1974 1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002
OECD AVERAGE  - 11 - 
 
Sweden’s per capita income appears to have grown broadly in line with the bulk of countries 
concentrated in the center of the sample until 1990. In the early 1990s, Sweden’s banking 
crisis and recession appear to have led to a permanently lower level of output, allowing a 
number of the countries to overtake Sweden in the GDP per capita rankings.  
 








































 The slippage in Sweden’s 
relative income reflects the 
convergence phenomenon. Figure 3 
compares each country’s relative 
GDP per capita in 1960 and 2003, 
and shows that, with the exception of 
Luxembourg and Turkey, there has 
been a pattern of convergence in 
relative incomes. Countries with per 
capita income above (below) the 
average in 1960 have experienced a 
relative decline (increase) in the 
period up to 2003. Sweden’s per 
capita income was above the mean in 
1960 and had fallen near to the mean 
by 2003.  
 
The deterioration in Sweden’s relative position is corroborated by measures of output 
per person of working age. Alternative measures to output per capita that take account of the 
differences in demographic structure across countries are output per employed person and 


















































































































































































Figure 3. Relative GDP per capita, 1960 and 2003  - 12 - 
 
output per working-age persons. Since employment rates vary with the business cycle and 
long-term unemployment rates differ across countries, output per employed person could be 
high because of either a high level of output or an exceptionally high unemployment rate. To 
avoid these problems, we focus on output per working-age person as the alternative income 
measure that adjusts for the demographic structure. Figure 4 compares the measures of 
income for Sweden and the OECD average for the period 1960-2003. The left panel divides 
the country’s income into its total population, whereas the right panel divides it into the 
working-age population. Both measures show that Sweden maintained its relative position 
above the average until its severe recession in the early 1990s. From the early 1990s, 
Sweden’s relative GDP per capita fell to the average of the 24 countries, whereas its relative 
GDP per working-age person fell, but remained above the average.  
 
Figure 4. Sweden and OECD: Income Measures, 1960-2003










1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000
Sweden
OECD average

















Since the OECD average includes a number of other countries in Scandinavia and 
continental Europe that also maintain large welfare states, we compare the pattern of income 
growth with that of the following OECD countries: Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the 
United Kingdom, and the United States. This comparator group has a relatively smaller tax-
transfer system (see, for example, OECD, Taxing Wages 2002/2003). Figure 5 illustrates that 
Swedish growth per capita has been in line with the average for the comparator group, falling 
during the banking crisis, as shown earlier. However, Swedish growth rates of output per 
working-age person compare well with those of the United States and with the average for 
the comparator group. Even accounting for the decline in the early 1990s, Swedish growth 
outpaced the average for the comparator group over the sample, moving income per worker 
from below the average in 1960 to above it in 2003. Growth rates strongly parallel 
developments in the United States and the average for the comparator group, except that the 
timing is asynchronous in the early part of the sample. 
   - 13 - 
 
Figure 5. Sweden and Comparator Countries: Income Measures, 1960-2003
Source: OECD; IMF, International Financial Statistics; and authors' calculations.










1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000
Sweden
Comparator group average





























Source: OECD; IMF, International Financial Statistics; and authors' calculations.
Note: Comparator group consists of Australia, Canada, New Zealand, United Kingdom, and United States.  
  
Swedish labor market indicators also compare well with those of other countries. In 
2002, the labor force participation rate in Sweden, although slightly below the Nordic 
average, was higher than that of the United States and surpassed the averages for the 
comparator group and the euro area. Unemployment was lower in Sweden in 2003 than in the   - 14 - 
 
United States and in the comparator groups. Indeed, Swedish unemployment rates were 
considerably below those in the United States until the banking crisis led to a sharp surge in 
unemployment, which has been only partly reversed in recent years.
6 
 
  Source: OECD Analytical Database, and OECD Employment Outlook.
Note: Labor market indicators are measured relative to population aged 15-64.
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6 However, active labor market programs averaged 2½ percent of the labor force over the last 
five years, raising total unemployment in Sweden slightly above the U.S. rate.   - 15 - 
 
The analysis above demonstrates that Sweden’s relative GDP per capita declined over 
1960–2003, but the relative deterioration occurred suddenly with the onset of the financial 
crisis in the early 1990s. If sclerosis were responsible for the slippage in rankings, we would 
expect to find a gradual deterioration of the relative position, consistent with persistent labor 
market distortions and other efficiency losses associated with high taxation and interventions. 
Instead, the relative slippage appears to be an outcome of macroeconomic policy errors 
leading to the financial crisis.  
 
Policy mistakes following Sweden’s post-liberalization boom contributed to the 
banking crisis and sharp recession in the early 1990s.
7 In the latter half of the 1980s, Sweden 
maintained a fixed exchange rate regime while having high inflation and rapid credit 
expansion. High inflation and tax policy interacted to produce negative real interest rates and 
a surge in private consumption and investment during the second half of the 1980s (see 
Figure 8). In 1990-91, Sweden reformed its tax system without suitable expenditure side 
adjustment. Additionally, attempts to maintain the fixed exchange rate despite a slowdown of 
external demand led to rapid disinflation. Real interest rates and the fiscal deficit 
skyrocketed, and asset markets collapsed. Personal saving rates soared for precautionary 
motives, spurred by the end of the asset price bubble and by concerns over proposals to cut 
back the welfare state. The unemployment rate rose to unprecedented levels and 
nonperforming loans in the banking system swelled. The costs of recapitalizing the banking 
sector were substantial, adding to public debt and concerns over debt sustainability.  
 
V.   ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS OF OUTPUT LOSS 
The sections above described the debate over Sweden’s growth performance. We 
argued that the relative slippage in ranking could be attributed to the output loss associated 
with the banking crisis rather than as a result of gradual but persistent “eurosclerosis.” In this 
section, we formalize the proposition that the banking crisis produced a permanent loss in 
output. We first describe different models of business cycles prevalent in the academic 
literature. We then use an econometric model to capture the essential properties of the 
leading theories of business cycle dynamics and to extract the temporary and permanent 
components of output. We allow both the temporary and the permanent components of 
output to undergo regime switching. The model estimates the conditional probabilities of the 
unobserved states, which include the probability that there was a decline in the permanent 
component of output at the time of the crisis. 
 
                                                 
7 For a detailed discussion of the Swedish crisis in the context of the Nordic banking crisis, 
see Drees and Pazarbaşioğlu (1998).   - 16 - 
 
Figure 8. Sweden's Banking Crisis: Boom and Bust
Source: IMF, OECD, and national authorities.









1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998
Real investment






































































































Net household savings ratio
(percent)




















































































(in percent of total bank assets)
 
 
   - 17 - 
 
A.   Theory 
The nature of output fluctuations continues to attract considerable academic debate 
and investigation, particularly among scholars of the business cycle. In a landmark study, 
Nelson and Plosser (1982) proposed that output is difference- rather than trend-stationary. 
Hamilton (1989) extended this concept of the business cycle with his pioneering work on 
regime switching. In his seminal paper, the stochastic trend in output undergoes regime 
switching between positive and negative growth states. Since the regime switch occurs in the 
growth rate of the permanent component, a negative state results in output loss that is 
permanent. The welfare consequence of the Hamilton model contrasts sharply with those of a 
model in which the regime switching occurs in a common temporary component of output. 
This second model has its roots in the work of Friedman (1964, 1993), in which recessions 
can be characterized as a temporary “pluck” down of output. After this large negative 
transitory shock dissipates, output returns to trend in a high-growth recovery phase. Since the 
Friedman recession represents a temporary deviation from trend, followed by a full recovery 
to the original trend line, the output loss is temporary.  
 
Our model is agnostic regarding the duration of output loss. Most of the literature that 
investigates the business cycle considers regime switching in only one of the components of 
output. As in Kim and Murray (2002) and Kim and Piger (2002), we allow both the 
permanent and temporary components of output to undergo regime switching. Kim and 
Piger, however, use only one state variable to control both components. Consequently, their 
model compels each recession to contain both temporary and permanent explanations. As in 
Kim and Murray, we use a model that has two independent state variables for the temporary 
and permanent factors. Such specification is considered superior to a single state variable 
model with two or three states, as it allows identification of whether the recession associated 
with Sweden’s banking crisis involved regime switching in the temporary or permanent 
components of output. Thus, the main interest of this section is to study whether the 
asymmetry between expansions and crisis-driven recessions are more consistent with the 
Hamilton or Friedman model of output loss. Both models involve “V-shape” growth 
recoveries, except that the Friedman model suggests that growth would be temporarily higher 
during the recovery than during a normal expansion. The econometric model used in this 
paper explores whether output springs back up to its original path following a crisis-driven 
recession, or whether growth simply recovers to its trend rate, implying that the level of 
output has been permanently reduced compared to the original path. 
 
To improve the identification of the permanent and temporary components of output, 
our model allows for comovement across economic times series, rather than employing 
univariate analysis. The crisis-induced recession in Sweden involved a simultaneous decline 
in several economic variables, which motivates the use of a dynamic linear factor model, as 
innovated by Stock and Watson (1989, 1991, 1993). Kim and Murray (2002) use a series of 
variables intended to capture comovement with industrial production and focus on 
constructing a coincident indicator. As in Kim and Piger (2002), we use output, investment, 
and consumption, which theory predicts should share a common stochastic trend. To check 
the robustness of the results, we use output, unemployment, and inflation, which should also 
exhibit synchronous movements over the business cycle. 
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B.   Econometric Model 
This section presents the specification of the dynamic two-factor model used for the 
empirical analysis. The logs of each of the three series of interest can be decomposed into a 
deterministic component, DTi, a permanent component, Pit, and a transitory component, Tit. 
 
it it i it T P DT Y + + =
r
 
t D a DT i i i + =  
it t i it n P ς + γ =  




= [output, investment, consumption], n is the common permanent component, x is 
the common temporary component, and ζ and ω are the independent idiosyncratic permanent 
and temporary components, respectively. The model can be written in differenced deviations 
from means as follows: 
 
  it t i t i it z x n y + ∆ λ + ∆ γ = ∆  
 
where  it it it z ω ∆ + ς ∆ =  is a stationary composite of the idiosyncratic components and γi and 
λi are the factor loadings on the common permanent and common transitory components, 
respectively. 
 
  The growth rate of the common permanent component is stationary and is 
approximated by a second order autoregressive process. Note that a stationary growth rate 
implies that the level is nonstationary, in accordance with the definition of a stochastic trend. 
In addition, there is a trend, β, that depends on the permanent state, S1t: 
 
 ) 1 , 0 (   . . . ~      ,   2 2 1 1 1 N d i i v v n n n t t t t t S t + ∆ φ + ∆ φ + β = ∆ − −  
 
The state-dependent trend introduces asymmetry along the lines of Hamilton (1989).  
 
} 1 , 0 {    ;   1 1 1 0 1 = β + β = β t t t S S S  
 
During an expansion phase (S1t=0) the stochastic trend grows with the drift rate β0. If β1 is 
negative, the trend shifts to a lower growth state when S1t=0, and shifts to a recession phase if 
β0+β1<0.  
 
  The common temporary component is stationary in its levels and is approximated by 
a second order autoregressive process. To incorporate Friedman’s type of asymmetry, we 
allow the temporary component to undergo regime switching in response to a second state 
variable, S2t. 
 
 ) 1 , 0 (   . . . ~     ,   2 12 1 11 2 N d i i u u x x S x t t t t t t + + + = − − φ φ τ    - 19 - 
 
 
In state S2t=0, the intercept is zero. If τi<0, then the economic series is “plucked” down when 
S2t=1. When the state returns to normal, S2t=0, the economy reverts back to trend level.  
 
Finally, each series has its own stationary idiosyncratic component, again 
approximated by an AR(2).
8 
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Both state variables are assumed to be independent first-order Markov switching 
processes with transition probabilities given by: 
 
[] [ ] 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 | 1 Pr    ,   0 | 0 Pr p S S q S S t t t t = = = = = = − −      and 
[] [ ] 2 1 2 2 2 1 2 2 1 | 1 Pr    ,   0 | 0 Pr p S S q S S t t t t = = = = = = − −  
 
C.   Data and Results 
Two datasets are used to identify the permanent and temporary output losses 
described above. Quarterly OECD data on output, private consumption, and private 
investment are used as the first dataset to extract the two components of GDP. The other 
dataset, also from OECD, consists of output, unemployment, and inflation. These are sets of 
variables that are expected to move together over the business cycle.  
 
The formal analysis supports the contention of a permanent decline in the level of 
output during Sweden’s banking crisis. The two datasets produce very similar identification 
of switching in the permanent output component. The results are shown in Figure 9. The 
probability of a switch to a recession regime in the permanent component of output 
essentially rises to one for several quarters from 1989 to early 1993. The timing and 
magnitude are nearly identical regardless of whether the permanent component is identified 
using output, consumption, and investment or output, unemployment, and inflation. The 
other episodes of recession in the permanent component of output that are identified by both 
datasets (with probabilities of recession exceeding 0.5) occurred in 1976-77 and 1980-82, 
associated with an oil shock and the worldwide recession related to the U.S. disinflation. The 
probability of a recession regime also surpasses a value of 0.5 for the dataset including 
output, unemployment, and inflation in 1971 (the first oil shock) and tenuously in 1996. The 
oil price shocks of the 1970s hit Sweden relatively hard given its energy-intensive production 
structure that included forestry and pulp, and automobile manufacture. Forestry, accounting 
                                                 
8 The assumption of unitary variance is made for identification, but the assumption is not 
particularly restrictive, as the variances of the permanent and temporary components of 
output, investment, and consumption depend on the magnitude of the factor loadings.   - 20 - 
 
for 40 percent of Swedish exports in the early 1970s, was particularly impaired by severe 
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The model appears to match well with the actual data, as shown in Figure 10 below. 
Actual log output (left scale) is compared to the change in the fitted value of the permanent 
component of output, using the smoothed probability of a switch to negative regime (right 
scale). Each episode of negative switch is strongly associated with stagnant or deteriorating 
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Figure 10. Log Output and Change in Fitted Values




VI.   CONCLUSIONS 
This paper finds that there was a permanent output decline associated with Sweden’s 
banking crisis. The decline led to a drop in Sweden’s per capita GDP relative to other OECD 
countries, and thus a sudden drop in Sweden’s ranking. Other than this permanent output loss 
and a few shallow recessions associated with oil shocks and worldwide recessions, Sweden’s 
growth rate matched the OECD average and exceeded a number of countries with relatively 
lower tax-transfer systems. 
 
These findings have important academic and policy implications. First, the result 
provides further documentation of the costs of banking crises and the importance of 
preventing them with appropriate financial sector supervision and regulation, as well as 
macroeconomic policies. These results are corroborated in Cerra and Saxena (2004 and 
2005), which indicate that permanent output loss is a consequence of most financial crises. 
Thus, the failure of output to recover to its pre-crisis trend line is not unique to Sweden and 
thus cannot be attributed to features of the welfare state model.    
 
Second, according to the analysis presented in the paper, there is no evidence that 
welfare state policies have led to sclerosis, as Sweden has performed at least as well as the 
average OECD or low tax-transfer comparator group country on a number of macroeconomic 
criteria. With low unemployment and high labor participation rates, Sweden’s labor market 
performance is enviable. Sweden made a number of macroeconomic mistakes that 
contributed to its financial crisis, but its growth rate has been in line with that of other 
countries except for the permanent loss associated with the crisis. Absent the crisis recession, 
Sweden’s income per capita might still rank near the top of all countries.  
 
Third, the analysis suggests caution in inference on growth. Lindbeck et al. (1994) 
assumed Sweden’s slippage in the per capita income rankings among OECD countries was 
due to sclerosis. But observing the time dimension of growth gives us greater insight: that is, 
Sweden’s relative growth rate and per capita income ranking declined precisely at the time of 
the banking crisis, rather than throughout the sample. We can extend the lesson from this 
finding to cross-sectional growth regressions. Many variables have been proposed to explain 
growth, but collinearity among the variables makes it difficult to identify the causes of 
growth. Incorporating the time dimension can help identify growth determinants among the 
many possible variables. For example, Sweden contributes one average growth rate 
observation in a cross-sectional growth regression. On the right-hand side, it contributes high 
average tax rates, but also a dummy for having had a banking crisis. In the cross-sectional 
analysis, the contribution of each left-hand side variable would be difficult to disentangle, 
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